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Case Comment
Board of Education v. Pico:
The Supreme Court's Answer to School Library
Censorship
I. INTRODUCTION
Censorship of school library materials has been increasing in recent years.'
Nearly one-fifth of the schools responding to a national survey 2 reported challenges
to library materials between September 1978 and June 1980. 3 About one-third of
these censorship attempts were blocked, but in one-half of the cases the material was
altered or removed prior to formal review. In forty percent of these instances no
reevaluation of the censorship decision ever took place. 4 Incidents like these limit the
availability of information in school libraries. 5 Furthermore, the legitimacy of book
banning is proving increasingly divisive in communities around the country.
6
As censorship attempts have become more frequent, so have federal court chal-
lenges to the removal of library materials. 7 Generally in these actions, the defendant
is the local school board, which argues its right to unfettered discretion in such
matters. Plaintiffs are most often students, sometimes joined by parents, teachers, or
librarians, who argue that when a book is banned they are denied their constitutional
rights under the first amendment. 8 The law in this area is unsettled, and the opinions
I. The American Library Association's Office of Intellectual Freedom considers it the "'most massive, vicious,
and sophisticated' censorship since McCarthyism of the 1950's." Arons, Book Burning in the Heartland, SAT. REv., July
21, 1979, at 29. See also CENsoSsv AND EDUCATION (E. Obler ed. 1981); Wellborn, As the Drive to Ban Books Spreads
in the U.S., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 8, 1982, at 66.
2. The survey, entitled "Books and Material Selection for School Libraries and Classrooms: Procedures,
Challenges and Responses," was jointly sponsored by the American Library Association and the Association of American
Publishers. Twenty-five percent of a random sample of 7500 school principals, librarians, and superintendents responded.
Kamhi, Censorship vs. Selection-Choosing Books for Schools, ANt. EDUC. 11, 11 (Mar. 1982).
3. Id. at 11, 16.
4. Id. at 13.
5. "Survey responses leave little doubt that local challenges resulted in a net reduction in the materials,
information, and ideas available to students.... [C]hallenges were often resolved by across-the-board actions limiting
access for all students. And rarely was other material selected to replace withdrawn or restricted items." Id.
6. Wellborn, supra note 1, at 66.
7. Book banning from the school library was at issue in the following cases: Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High
School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th
Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v.
Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Sheck v. Baileyville School
Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
8. See, e.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
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of the lower courts conflict. 9 Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court
heard an appeal in one such case, Board of Education v. Pico.10
The Pico case arose after the Island Trees School Board removed nine books"
from the junior and senior high school libraries because the books were "vulgar and
in bad taste.", 12 The issue was whether the School Board's traditional discretion in
local matters allowed it to remove the books without impermissibly abridging the first
amendment rights of students. 3 The Court's deeply divided decision does not offer
clear guidelines for resolving future controversies. However, since Pico is the Su-
preme Court's only pronouncement on this issue, the decision warrants analysis to
reveal what, if any, guidance it offers.
After briefly discussing the constitutional background,' 4 the lower court de-
cisions, '5 and the seven Supreme Court opinions,' 6 this Case Comment will examine
the Pico decision to determine what precisely was decided.'" The problem of the
precedential weight to be given to Supreme Court plurality opinions will be ex-
amined is in order to evaluate the decision and assess its implications for the future.' 9
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
To fully understand Pico it is necessary to review its constitutional background.
None of the issues is fully developed in the Pico opinions, but all relate to the general
resolution of the book banning controversy.
The traditional function of public education is to prepare the nation's children
for enlightened, responsible citizenship. 20 To fulfill this responsibility public schools
9. The complaints were dismissed in Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); and Presidents Council, Dist. 25
v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). However, in Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), and Sheck v. Baileyville School Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679
(D. Me. 1982), the courts found that defendants had violated plaintiffs' rights to receive ideas. The court in Salvail v.
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979), held that the School Board had failed to show an interest
sufficient to justify its infringement of plaintiffs' rights. Id. at 1275. In Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm.,
454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), the court found that students had a right to have access to ideas and to read
controversial materials. Id. at 714.
10. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
11. The books were Go Ask Alice; Best Short Stories by Negro Writers (Langston Hughes, ed.); Alice Childress' A
Hero Ain't Nothing but a Sandwich; Eldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice; Bernard Malamud's The Fixer Desmond Morris' The
Naked Ape; A Reader for Writers (Jerome Archer, ed.); Piri Thomas' Down These Mean Streets; and Kurt Vonnegut's
Slaughter House Five. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 389 nn.2-4 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
12. Id. at 396.
13. Id. at 389.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 20-33.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 34-66.
16. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion in which Justices Marshall and Stevens concurred. See infra text
accompanying notes 69-85. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred in much, but not all, of the
plurality opinion. See infra text accompaning notes 86-91. Justice White concurred only in the judgment. See infra text
accompanying notes 92-93. Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor. See infra text accompanying notes 94-104. Justices Powell and O'Connor each wrote separate dissenting
opinions. See infra text accompanying notes 105-08 & 114-15. Justice Rehnquist also wrote a separate dissent, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. See infra text accompaning notes 109-13.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 129-56.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 116-28.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 157-212.
20. Education "is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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must inculcate "fundamental values."'" Local control of education is important to
assure preservation and transmission of the community's moral and cultural
heritage;22 therefore courts generally have accorded school authorities broad dis-
cretion.23 Judicial restraint is tempered, however, by the need to protect fundamental
constitutional rights. The traditional threshold test for judicial review has been
whether the actions of school authorities "directly and sharply implicate basic con-
stitutional values.''24
Since the plaintiffs in book banning cases like Pico are typically junior and
senior high school students, the extent to which children have rights under established
constitutional doctrine is an additional consideration in evaluating the appropriateness
of judicial review of school board actions?3 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District26 suggests that the Supreme Court is willing, at least in
some contexts, to extend first amendment protections to the activities of minors. In
Tinker the Court found that students have a constitutional right to express political
ideas in school so long as no disruption results. 27
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school
as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect .... In our system, students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved.
28
Despite this strong statement of student rights, Tinker was not determinative in Pico
because the library book removals impinged upon the right of access to information
rather than the right of speech or expression.
Emphasizing the rights of recipients of speech, the Supreme Court in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.2 9 restricted the
21. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). "Today [education] is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Note, 55 TEx. L. REv. 511, 513 (1977).
22. Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MIcH. L. Rv. 1373, 1380 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Project, Education and the Law]; Note, 55 TEx. L. Rav. 511, 513 (1977).
23. "By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts
do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do
not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). See also
Niccolai, The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J.L. & EDuc. 23, 23 (1981); Project, Education and the
Law, supra note 22, at 1375; Comment, What Johnny Can't Read: School Boards and the First Amendment, 42 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 653 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, What Johnny Can't Read].
24. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943), where the Court stated that "[tlhe Fourteenth Amendment... protects the citizen against the State
itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have... important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 637.
25. Because of their immaturity, the constitutional rights of children have sometimes been found more limited than
those of adults. See. e.g., Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (constitutional to forbid selling materials to
minors on obscenity grounds even though material not obscene for an adult); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (constitutional to prohibit children from selling merchandise in public places). See also Tushnet, Free Expression
and the Young Adult: A Constitutional Framework, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 746, 747.
26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (unconstitutional for school authorities to forbid students to wear armbands protesting the
Vietnam War at school).
27. Id. at 511, 513.
28. Id. at 511.
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). "Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists.., the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both." Id. at 756 (footnote omitted).
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authority of a governmental body to regulate speech by impeding the flow of com-
mercial information to the public. Although it appeared to recognize a constitutional
right to receive information, the Virginia Pharmacy Board decision involved the
commercial setting and did not consider the school environment. Thus, the degree to
which the decision stands for a doctrine that would recognize constitutional protec-
tion of students' right of access in the context of public education is unclear.
Because the concept of academic freedom includes the right to express and
receive ideas, 3" it would seem highly germane to the dispute in Pico. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has declared strong constitutional support for academic freedom:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom .... That free-
dom is ... a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." . . . The
classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection."
31
Notwithstanding the Court's discussion of academic freedom in terms of the con-
stitutional protection of speech, the concept is not grounded in any unified legal
theory. Furthermore, academic freedom has traditionally applied only to uni-
versities32 although some court decisions have extended it to secondary education. 33
In Pico the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile these diverse interests, but
because different Justices placed different values on the competing interests, the
attempt did not succeed.
I1. THE Pico DECISIONS
A. Facts
Three members of the Island Trees School Board attended a conference spon-
sored by the Parents of New York United, a group of conservative parents. At the
conference these members received a list of "objectionable" books. 3 4 Two months
later, two members searched the high school library catalog and discovered nine of
the "objectionable" books in the school library collection. 35 They found one more of
30. For a discussion of academic freedom, see Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HAiv. L. REv.
1045 (1968).
31. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960); and United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
32. Niccolai, supra note 23, at 26; Project, Education and the Law, supra note 22, at 1440.
33. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (quoting with approval Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967)); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion"); James v. Board of
Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Project, Education and the Law, supra note 22,
at 1440.
34. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The heading on the list read: "DO NOT LET
THIS MATERIAL FALL INTO THE HANDS OF OUR YOUNGSTERS." Censoring the School Library: Do Students
Have the Right to Read?, 10 CONN. L. REv. 747, 748 n.5 (1978). The list included the titles of the books and, for most of
them, a series of out-of-context quotations. In a few cases, only a critical remark accompanied the title. Pico v. Board of
Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The books were Go Ask Alice; Best Short
Stories by Negro Writers (Langston Hughes ed.); Alice Childress' A Hero Ain't Nothing but a Sandwich; Eldridge
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the books in the junior high school library36 and eventually discovered that another
book from the list had been approved by the School Board for inclusion in a twelfth-
grade literature course. 3 7 The Board, in an executive session and over the objections
of the school superintendent, 38 declined to follow its established procedure and had
all copies of these books immediately removed from the libraries to the Board's
office. 3 9 After the removal, the Board appointed a committee of parents and staff
members to review the books and determine their "educational suitability." This
committee ultimately recommended the return, subject to parental approval, of one of
the books to both the library and curriculum, the return of four others to the library
without restriction, the return of another for circulation with parental approval, and
the removal of two of the books from the library. The committee could not agree on a
recommendation for two of the books, and no opinion was given on another because
not all of the committee members had read it.40 The School Board, without explana-
tion, ignored its committee's recommendations and returned one of the books to the
library, returned another subject to parental approval, and removed the remaining
nine books from both the library and the curriculum. The Board directed that these
books were not to be included on required, optional, or suggested reading lists but
could still be discussed in class.4t The Board justified the removals by asserting that
the books were "'anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semetic [sic], and just plain
filthy.' ,42 They did not maintain that the books were obscene. 43
At the time the suit was filed, plaintiffs were four high school students and one
junior high school student in the Island Trees Union Free School District. Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant School Board had violated their first amendment rights by
removing books from the school libraries solely on the basis of the Board members'
personal beliefs that the books were "irrelevant, vulgar, immoral, and in bad
taste." 44
B. The District Court Decision
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York found that an earlier
Second Circuit case, Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Board No.
25,45 controlled the resolution of Pico.4 6 The Presidents Council court held that when
Cleaver's Soul on Ice; Oliver LaFarge's Laughing Boy; Desmond Morris' The Naked Ape; Piri Thomas' Down These
Mean Streets; Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughter House Five; and Richard Wright's Black Boy.
36. Id. That book was A Reader for Writers (Jerome Archer, ed.).
37. Id. That book was Bernard Malamud's The Fixer.
38. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 408-09 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1980). The school superintendent objected to the
Board's ad hoc removal of the books, urging that the established procedure for dealing with such issues should be
followed. Id. at 409.
39. Id. at 409.
40. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 391 & nn.6-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
41. Id. at 391 & nn.12-14.
42. Id. at 390 (quoting from a press release issued by the Board). The press release continued:
This Board of Education wants to make it clear that we in no way are BOOK BANNERS or BOOK
BURNERS .... [W]e all agree that these books simply DO NOT belong in school libraries....
It is our duty, our moral obligation, to protect the children in our schools from this moral danger as surely
as from physical and medical dangers.
Id. (emphasis in original).
43. Id. at 392.
44. Id.
45. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). See infra text accompanying notes 157-63.
46. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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the School Board removed a book from the school library and then returned it subject
to limited circulation, the Board did not infringe any constitutional right.47 According
to the Presidents Council court, a school board has the ultimate authority to select
books for the school library and can also remove any books that board members feel
were improperly selected. 48 The court considered that elected school board members,
rather than courts, are the proper agents to decide book removal issues. Judicial
intervention into such disputes should be limited to instances in which basic con-
stitutional values are "'directly and sharply implicate[d]."' 49 The court held that the
issues in Presidents Council did not raise such constitutional questions and granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Pico district court adopted the Presi-
dents Council reasoning and likewise granted the Island Trees School Board's motion
for summary judgment.5 °
C. The Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a split decision, held that
there was a material issue of fact whether the School Board's motivations for the
book removals were constitutional. 51 The case was remanded to determine these
52motivations.
While the court acknowledged the tradition of local control of public education
and courts' general reluctance to intervene in local school board decisions, 53 it also
recognized the indoctrinational function of education, 54 students' constitutional
rights,55 and the first amendment limitations on actions by boards of education.5 6 The
court found that all these interests had to be taken into account. While a book removal
may have constitutional implications, mere allegations that books have been removed
from the school library do not make out a prima facie first amendment violation. 57
The court distinguished Presidents Council, noting that in Pico plaintiffs had
raised questions of constitutional magnitude about the School Board's motivation by
showing that the book removals were "an unusual and irregular intervention in the
school libraries' operations by persons not routinely concerned with such matters."
58
For Judge Sifton, who wrote the majority opinion, the School Board's actions raised
the distinct possibility of a first amendment violation because an established pro-
cedure was not followed. His test was whether the defendants could justify the
limitations on students' constitutional rights by showing that a valid educational
interest was materially threatened.59 Judge Sifton would have decided the case on the
47. 457 F.2d 289, 291 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 293.
49. Id. at 291 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
50. 474 F. Supp. 387, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
51. Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980). Each of the three judges wrote a separate opinion. A
petition for rehearing or rehearing en bane was denied by a 5-5 vote. 646 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. 638 F.2d 404, 407 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 412 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
54. Id. at 412 (citing James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972)).
55. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
56. Id. at 412-13 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
57. Id. at 414-15.
58. Id.
59. Ad. at 415 (citing James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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merits for the plaintiffs because he felt it could be inferred that the Board's "political
views and personal taste [were] being asserted not in the interests of the children's
well-being, but rather for the purpose of establishing those views as the correct and
orthodox ones for all purposes in the particular community."-
60
Judge Newman wrote a separate opinion in which he concurred in Judge Sifton's
opinion but argued that a trial was needed to determine whether the facts supported
plaintiffs' allegations.6 1 If the School Board had attempted to suppress the ideas
contained in the removed books, he would have held that the students' rights had
been violated.6 2 Defendants argued, however, that "the books were removed because
of vulgar language and explicit sexual descriptions."- 63 For Judge Newman, school
authorities have considerable discretion in such instances. He argued that to prevail
plaintiffs would have to show that the justifications of the School Board were not the
true motives for the removals. An impermissible motivation would render the
Board's censorship unconstitutional even if it were not the only motivation.
64
Judge Mansfield, in dissent, argued that the majority was overruling Presidents
Council and that its decision represented an unnecessary interference with the School
Board's discretion. 65 To him the issues did not rise to a constitutional level because
the Board's justifications for the removals, that the books were in bad taste, indecent,
and educationally unsuitable, were constitutionally permissible. 66
D. The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, five
Justices agreeing that because there was a material issue of fact summary judgment
was inappropriate. 67 The case was remanded for trial to determine the motivation of
the School Board in removing the library books.
68
1. Justice Brennan's Plurality Opinion
Justice Brennan, in the plurality opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens
and joined in part by Justice Blackmun, concluded that the first amendment does
impose limits upon a school board's discretion and that the removal of books from a
school library might impinge upon students' constitutional rights.69 Justice Brennan
carefully narrowed the issue to the removal of library books that had been selected for
the library with the approval of the school board, or at least without their objection,
and that were intended for noncompulsory reading outside of the classroom.70
60. Id. at 417.
61. Id. at 437-38 (Newman, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 436.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 437.
65. Id. at 419 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 429, 432.
67. 457 U.S. 853, 853-55 (1982).
68. There will not be a trial on the merits because the Island Trees School Board returned the books to the library
shelves after the Supreme Court decision. The Board instructed the librarian to send a note to the parents of any student
who checked out the books. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1982, at 81, cols. 4-5.
69. 457 U.S. 853, 874-75 (1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
70. Id. at 861-62.
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The opinion acknowledged that because school boards traditionally have been
accorded broad discretion in the management of local school affairs, courts should be
reluctant to intervene. 7 1 The plurality recognized that schools have an important duty
to inculcate community values and to promote traditional ideals, but emphasized that
school boards must operate within the constraints of the first amendment.72 For the
plurality, students do not "'shed their rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.' ,73 Although courts should intervene only when "'basic con-
stitutional values'" are "'directly and sharply implicate[d]," 74 the plurality held
that the first amendment rights of students could be "directly and sharply im-
plicated" by book removals from the school library.75
For the plurality, a right to receive information and ideas is a necessary corollary
to the rights of free speech and press. 76 Students, as well as adults, should benefit
from this right because students are entitled to constitutional protection and can "'not
be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate.' ' '77 The plurality found that the school library, which is a part of
school where no one is forced to read a specific book, is an especially appropriate
place for students to exercise their right to receive information and ideas.
78
Although a school board has substantial discretion to determine the school
library's collection, it cannot exercise this discretion "in a narrowly partisan or
political manner. 7 9 The test of permissible exercise of discretion is whether a school
board intends to deny its students access to ideas that the board finds disagreeable. If
this is the "decisive factor" 80 in a book removal decision, the school board violates
its students' constitutional rights because such motives tend to prescribe an un-
constitutional official orthodoxy. 8 Under the plurality's test, constitutionally accept-
able motivations can be shown if the books are removed because they are deemed
"pervasively vulgar" or educationally unsuitable. 82 These motives do not threaten to
suppress ideas and therefore are constitutionally permissible.
In order to determine a board's motivation, the plurality recommended close
scrutiny of the procedures used and found that the record in Pico showed that the
board had followed irregular procedures, which at least suggested a lack of concern
for students' rights.8 3 On this basis the plurality found that the district court had
improperly granted summary judgment: a genuine issue of material fact existed
concerning the motivation of the School Board. The case was remanded to determine
71. Id. at 863-64.
72. Id. at 864.
73. Id. at 865 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
74. Id. at 866 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 866-67.
77. Id. at 868 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
78. Id. at 868-69.
79. Id. at 870.
80. "Decisive factor" was defined by Justice Brennan as a "substantial factor" without which the opposite decision
would have been made. Id. at 871 n.22.
81. Id. at 871 (west Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), prohibited the establishment of
an official orthodoxy in a school).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 875.
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whether the Board's decision rested on its desire to suppress the ideas within the
censored books or to establish a political orthodoxy based on the Board members'
personal values. 84 If either motivation were decisive, the book removals would be
unconstitutional. 
85
2. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence
Justice Blackmun concurred in most of the plurality opinion and in the judg-
ment 86 but did not accept Justice Brennan's assertion of a right to receive information
and ideas in the school library. 87 He felt that such a right implies an affirmative duty
for the schools to provide students with specific information. With this he disagreed.
He also considered school libraries a part of the total school environment and as
appropriate a place to inculcate community values as anywhere else in the school.88
For Justice Blackmun, "[tihe State may not suppress exposure to ideas-for the
sole purpose of suppressing exposure to those ideas-absent sufficient compelling
reasons." 8 9 He would have balanced the inculcative duty of the school board against
the first amendment prohibition of state-sponsored orthodoxy in the classroom. The
inculcative nature of schools limits students' first amendment rights, but schools still
must allow diversity in thought. Justice Blackmun argued that a school board must
justify a book removal decision by showing a purpose other than the suppression of
an idea disagreeable to its members. Any content-based removal resting only on
school board members' disapproval of the books would be unconstitutional because it
would tend to establish an official orthodoxy.90 He would allow the removal of books
because they contain offensive language, express ideas adverse to the public welfare,
or are "inappropriate for the age group." 91 He felt that those motivations do not
threaten to impose an official orthodoxy and are constitutional.
3. Justice White's Decision Concurring Only in the Judgment
Justice White concurred in the judgment but refused to address the constitutional
questions. He felt those issues should not be addressed until the trial court resolved
the factual issue of the School Board's motivation for the removal of the library
books. 92 As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, Justice White's opinion is really a "single
vote to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted."-
93
4. Chief Justice Burger's Dissent
Chief Justice Burger dissented and was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist,
and O'Connor.94 The dissent contended that because the Island Trees School Board
84. Id.
85. Id. at 871-72.
86. Id. at 875-76.
87. Id. at 878-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 877 (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 879-80.
91. Id. at 880.
92. Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 904 n.1 (Rchnquisi, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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had the authority to remove books from the school library, there was no genuine issue
of material fact to be determined on remand.95 The dissenters noted that the plurality
decision stripped locally elected school boards of their broad discretion to administer
public schools by subjecting the authority of school boards to federal court review. 96
The dissent argued that in allowing the removal of books deemed "educationally
unsuitable" or "pervasively vulgar," the plurality offered neither guidance for
application of those standards nor any rationale for their adoption as a basis for
removing books. Ultimately, the courts would have to rule on the validity of the
motivation for each book removal case, which would violate local control of public
education.97
The dissent's basic argument was that elected school boards are better suited to
decide library book disputes than are federal courts. Under the plurality's "right to
receive information," courts would substitute their views for those of the local
authorities, and the Supreme Court would become a "super censor." 9 The dissent-
ers emphasized a school board's duty to inculcate community values and asserted that
the board members' personal values and preferences are constitutional grounds for
deciding what is appropriate educational material. 99
The dissent accepted the Tinker holding that students have constitutional
rights1° ° but argued that in this instance those rights had not been threatened. The
Chief Justice determined that no restraints had been placed on the students since they
were permitted to read the removed books elsewhere and could discuss the ideas
anywhere, even in the classroom. 0
1
Since both parties agreed that the books were removed because the Board found
them "irrelevant, vulgar, immoral, and in bad taste, making them educationally
unsuitable for the district's junior and senior high school students,"' 0 2 the dissent
found no genuine issue of material fact in the case. In stating that school boards must
make content-based decisions in order to fulfill their duty to inculcate community
values and that such decisions are properly based on the board members' value
judgments, 0 3 the dissenters apparently would have granted school boards unreview-
able local discretion. Accordingly, the appropriate place to challenge board decisions
is at the polls.'4
5. Justice Powell's Dissent
Justice Powell, in a separate dissent, 0 5 expressed his concern that the plurality
would undermine the respect and authority of local school boards. Arguing that
95. Id. at 890-91, 891 n.5.
96. Id. at 891-92.
97. Id. at 890-91.
98. Id. at 885.
99. Id. 890-91, 891 n.5.
100. Id. at 886.
101. Id. The books were available at bookstores and at the public library. Id.
102. Id. at 885 n.l.
103. Id. at 889.
104. Id. at 891. In the Pico case the School Board had made the book removals a major election issue, and the two
incumbents who ran were reelected. 638 F.2d 404, 411 (2d Cir. 1980).
105. 457 U.S. 853, 893 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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public school boards are specifically directed to inculcate basic community values in
the future citizens of the country, he found that the Island Trees School Board was
only fulfilling this obligation. 'I He concluded his opinion on a curious note: "In
different contexts and in different times, the destruction of written materials has been
the symbol of despotism and intolerance. But the removal of nine vulgar or racist
books from a high school library by a concerned local school board does not raise this
specter." 10 7 One wonders what would "raise this specter" for Justice Powell. 108
6. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissent joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell,' 09 asserted that school board members must act on their own personal
values in making educational decisions and inculcating youth with basic social val-
ues.'1 0 He argued that because education involves a selective exposure to informa-
tion, it is for local school authorities to determine what material is relevant.' 1 I A
school library is simply a part of the school's teaching environment and not subject to
separate rules." 2 Justice Rehnquist concluded that the students' rights to speak or
express themselves had not been infringed since the banned books were readily
available elsewhere. 113
7. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
In a brief opinion Justice O'Connor argued that "it is not the function of the
courts to make the decisions that have been properly relegated to the elected members
of school boards." 114 For her, a school board has the discretion to determine the
"educational suitability" of a book and can remove books from the school library so




An initial problem raised by the Pico decision concerns the weight it is to be
given as a precedent. Because a majority of justices did not concur in any one
opinion, the authority of Pico is limited. 116 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
106. Id. at 896.
107. Id. at 897.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
109. 457 U.S. 853, 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 909.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 910.
113. Id. at 915.
114. Id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 135-37 (1912); Note, The Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Precedential Value];
Comment. Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, No-Clear-Majority Decisions]. See Baker v. State, 15Md. App. 73,289 A.2d 348 (1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973) (court efused tobe bound by U.S. v. Join, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), in which fourjustices
joined the opinion, two joined in the judgment only, and three dissented); People ex rel. Marlowe v. Martin, 192 Misc.
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already concluded that Pico has no precedential value for interpretation of the first
amendment because only four of the Justices in the majority addressed the free speech
issues, while Justice White concurred only in the decision to remand and refused to
address the constitutional issues. 117 Marks v. United States, 8 in which the Supreme
Court instructed that when no one rationale is joined by five Justices the position
taken by the Justice concurring in the judgment on the narrowest grounds should be
viewed as the holding of the case," 9 supports the Fifth Circuit's assessment of Pico.
This leaves a 4-4 or a (3 + 1)-4 120 split of opinion on the constitutional questions and
limits the stare decisis 12' effect to those issues on which a majority of Justices did
agree. 1
22
Because of the need for guidelines, the precedential effect of plurality Supreme
Court decisions, although usually more than nil, is frequently difficult to de-
termine.' 23 The interpretation of plurality opinions tends to vary depending on the
actual divisions among the Justices.' 24 The fact that Justices concur in different
opinions does not preclude agreement of a majority on a single point of law.l'Z If four
Justices in dissent agree with one Justice from the majority on a single issue, there is a
majority, with resultant stare decisis effect.
Since in a plurality decision a majority of the Justices have agreed on a result
that binds the parties, sometimes that result can have precedential effect on future
cases with similar facts.' 26 In such cases it is the result, not the rationale, that is
authoritative. This is generally true when the issue is dismissal of the case rather than
a determination on the merits.127 Pico is such a case since five Justices agreed that
summary judgment is inappropriate when a school board has removed books from the
school library. However, the reasoning of the various opinions in Pico has limited
authority since no opinion reflects the views of a majority of the Court. 128 Nonethe-
less, it is still valuable to consider these opinions because, without achieving the
weightiness of stare decisis, the individual opinions do offer insight into the concerns
192, 83 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Wyoming County Ct. 1948) (court refused to be bound by Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145
(1947), in which there was a 4-1-4 split similar to that in Pica). See generally Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial
Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1127 (1981).
117. Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.30 (5th Cir. 1982).
118. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
119. Id. at 193.
120. Justice Blackmun concurred in much of the plurality opinion but not all of it. The particular split depends on the
issue. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
121. See generally H. BLACK, supra note 116, at 182-99, for a discussion of the stare decisis principle.
122. Comment, No-Clear-Majority Decisions, supra note 116.
"There must be a concurrence of a majority of the judges upon the principles, rules of law, announced in the
case, before they can be considered settled by a decision. If the court is equally divided or less than a majority
concur in a rule, no one will claim that it has the force of the authority of the court."
Id. at 100 n. 10 (quoting WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 50 (2d ed. 1894)). See also Note, Precedential Value. supra
note 116, at 779.
123. See Note, Precedential Value, supra note 116. See generally Comment, No-Clear-Majorty Decisions, supra
note 116, which discusses how less than majority opinions have been used as authority.
124. Note, Precedential Value, supra note 116, at 767.
125. Id. at 768.
126. H. BLACK, supra note 116, at 135-37; Note, Precedential Value, supra note 116, at 769-74 & n. 65.
127. Note, Precedential Value, supra note 116, at 770.
128. See supra note 116.
1114 [Vol. 44:1103
SCHOOL LIBRARY CENSORSHIP
of the different Justices and may offer guidance to their positions in a similar case in
the future.
B. The Pico Decision: What Was Decided?
Justice White's position is the most narrow and places the most severe limita-
tions on analysis of Pico and any attempt to establish guidelines. 129 By affirming the
appeals court and refusing to address the constitutional issues, he stated his belief that
certiorari had been improvidently granted. 130 His opinion does not offer any insight
into his views on the merits, but he did concur in the decision to remand and agreed
with the appellate court that the School Board's motivation was a crucial, unresolved
factual issue. That Justice White agreed with the others in the majority that a library
book removal can so abridge students' first amendment rights that it warrants court
intervention can be inferred from his failure to join in the dissent's position that
defendants' motion for summary judgment should have been granted.
A majority of the Pico Court agreed, then, that it is possible for a plaintiff to
show a constitutional violation when a school board removes books from a school
library. This is true because a school board's discretion is subject to court review if it
appears that the motivation for the removals might have been unconstitutional. Since
a majority of the Supreme Court agreed on these two issues, Pico should be consid-
ered to have settled them, with the appropriate stare decisis effect. Henceforth, each
case will have to be individually litigated once plaintiffs can establish that the motiva-
tion may not have been constitutionally acceptable. Plaintiffs will still have to prove
their case in a full trial on the merits, but the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case has been lightened, and the cause made legitimate.
How the courts will rule on the merits is uncertain, however, and whether school
boards will be restrained for motives that are merely suspect or only for flagrant
abuses of discretion remains open. The lower courts will have to determine on their
own where to draw the lines, at least until the Supreme Court speaks with a more
unified voice. The lower courts may well look to the Pico opinions for suggested
guidelines even though its authority is not mandatory. The opinions of the plurality
and Justice Blackmun set out the issues and tests these Justices feel would be control-
ling. While Justice Blackmun's opinion is narrower than the plurality's,1 3' he con-
curred in most of the plurality opinion and accepted the plurality's guidelines for
remand. 132
129. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
130. Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 904 n.1 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Ordinarily Justices abide by
the self-imposed "'rule of four" whereby a vote of a minority of four Justices binds the Court to take the case and rule on
its merits. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 509 n.23 (1957). See generally Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57
CoLuM. L. REv. 975 (1957).
131. If Justice Blackmun would decide a case for plaintiffs using the criteria he set out in Pico, the plurality, using
their criteria, would probably also rule in plaintiffs' favor. The reverse is not necessarily true. Therefore, Justice
Blackmun's opinion is narrower than that of the plurality. Note, Precedential Value, supra note 116, at 764. As pointed
out in the text accompanying notes 118-19 supra, the narrower opinion places a limitation on the broader opinion's
precedential authority.
132. 457 U.S. 853, 875-76 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The guidelines for the remand proceedings' 33 directed close scrutiny of the
School Board's procedures in removing the books. The record showed that the Board
had not followed its own established procedures; had singled out only those books on
the "objectionable books" list provided by an outside organization; had ignored the
advice of its superintendent of schools; had ignored the advice of teachers, librarians,
and literary experts; and had not explained the rejection of the book review com-
mittee's recommendations. 134 By establishing these procedural irregularities, plain-
tiffs had successfully shown a possible constitutional violation. The burden of proof
then shifted to the School Board to show that its motivations for the removals were
constitutional. 1
35
For the plurality and Justice Blackmun, the Board could successfully justify its
removal decision if that decision was not intended to suppress ideas or impose an
official orthodoxy. 136 Constitutionally valid motivations for the plurality would in-
clude removal because a book was "pervasively vulgar" or educationally un-
suitable.' 3 7 For Justice Blackmun a permissible justification would be that a book
contained "offensive language," was "inappropriate for the age group," or ad-
vanced ideas adverse to the public welfare.
138
The plurality found that students have a constitutionally protected right to re-
ceive ideas and information and that the special nature of the school library makes it
the place within a school where students can assert this right. Justice Blackmun,
however, did not support the students' right to receive ideas and doubted the exis-
tence of a valid distinction between the library and the rest of the school. Because on
these points he was aligned with the dissent, Justice Blackmun and the four dissenters
constitute a majority whose views should be regarded as precedential authority for the
nonexistence of this right. 139
In rejecting the asserted right of students to receive information in the library,
the dissent and Justice Blackmun agreed that schools have no duty to provide students
with specific information. 140 This proposition may be acceptable to the plurality so
long as specific ideas are not being excluded deliberately. The plurality's distinction
between book selection and book removal' 41 can be seen as a tacit admission that
schools cannot, and are not obligated to, provide all information in the school setting.
The difference of opinion appears only when a book is removed. For the plurality,
once a book has been selected and not objected to by a school board or its agents,
students have a constitutional right of access to that book in the school library unless
133. See supra note 68.
134. 457 U.S. 853, 874-75 (1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
135. Id. at 870. Under the standard set out in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977), to challenge the defendant's decision on constitutional grounds the plaintiff must first show that the decision was
substantially affected by the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. Once that has been done, the burden shifts to the
defendant, who must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision was not based on the protected conduct.
Id. at 287. See also Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1044 (5th Cir. 1982).
136. 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
139. See supra text accompanying note 125.
140. 457 U.S. 853, 878 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 887 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 862, 871-72 (opinion of Brennan, J.). The dissent disagreed with this distinction, id. at 892 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting), and Justice Blackmun expressed doubt about the distinction. Id. at 878 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the school board can show a constitutionally permissible justification for its
removal.' 4 2 Justice Blackmun did not find a constitutional right of access to library
books, but he nevertheless agreed with the plurality that books can be removed only if
the school board can show the absence of any intent to suppress ideas or to impose an
official orthodoxy on the schools.' 4 3 Neither the plurality nor Justice Blackmun
found that the school owes its students access to every book the students might wish
to read.44 However, a board does owe its students a duty not to censor what has been
properly made available simply because of the personal preferences and values of the
school board members. 14
5
In general, Justice Blackmun felt that students' first amendment rights in school,
including the library, are more circumscribed than did the plurality. Both point to the
special environment of the school and its necessary limitations on student rights,
14 6
but Justice Blackmun would balance what he found to be a school board's authority to
administer the schools and inculcate community ideals against "the limited con-
stitutional restriction .... imposed by the First Amendment." 147 He would hold
"that school officials may not remove books for the purpose of restricting access to
the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that action is
motivated simply by the officials' disapproval of the ideas involved." 148
In summary, the plurality and Justice Blackmun agreed that an intent to suppress
ideas or to impose an official orthodoxy over the school is impermissible.' 49 Books
may be removed from the school library for constitutionally neutral reasons but not
simply because the content of the books is personally offensive to board members. In
order to ascertain the board's motivation, courts should look at the particular facts of
the case and the procedure that was followed.150 Since only four Justices concurred in
these directives, they have no stare decisis value. Lower courts looking for guidance,
however, may be persuaded by this reasoning until more decisive guidelines are
developed.
C. The Dissenting Opinions
The lack of agreement in the majority opinion, which leaves much of the book
removal issue unresolved, points to the real possibility that in a subsequent decision
the dissent might be in the majority. 15' Thus, it is appropriate to analyze briefly the
dissenting opinions.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37 concerning justifications that the plurality would consider
constitutionally acceptable.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
144. 457 U.S. 853, 862 (1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 871-72 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Justice Blackmun joined in this part of the plurality opinion. id. at 855.
146. Id. at 864-65 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 879-80 (emphasis in original).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81 & 89-91.
150. 457 U.S. 853, 872-74 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Justice Blackmun concurred in this part of the plurality
opinion. Id. at 855.
151. Since five of the Justices who participated in Pico are over 70 years of age, the makeup of the Court could
change in the foreseeable future. A small change in the Court's personnel could result in the opposite outcome in a future
case.
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All four of the dissenting Justices concurred in Chief Justice Burger's opinion.
Their viewpoints were more unified than were those of the majority. For the dissent,
the issues were whether school boards or federal judges should administer local
schools, and whether "morality, good taste and relevance to education" are valid
justifications for decisions to remove books from school libraries.' 52 All of the
dissenting Justices agreed that these decisions should be left to local school boards
and that the judiciary has no place in resolving such issues.'5 3 Emphasizing the broad
discretion that school boards need to administer schools and to inculcate fundamental
community values, 154 they also agreed that the School Board's justification in Pico
was constitutionally valid. -55 Preventing the abuse of this discretion should be left to
the local voters at the polls. 156 In brief, the dissent essentially would allow elected
school boards unreviewable discretion in book removal cases.
D. Applications of Pico
In order to determine how to apply Pico's guidelines, such as they are, it is
helpful to analyze briefly several of the previously decided lower court cases in light
of the recent Supreme Court decision. This is a necessarily speculative venture since
Justice White did not address the constitutional issues, and courts are not bound by
the Pico opinions.
The earliest case to be litigated, and one used as precedent for several subse-
quent decisions, 157 was Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Board
No. 25.158 In Presidents Council a group of parents, teachers, librarians, and students
challenged the School Board's limitations on access to a book in the district's junior
high school libraries.' 59 After parents objected to the book's obscenities and explicit
sexual references, the Board, in an executive session, ordered its removal from the
libraries. Six weeks later, at a public meeting, the Board returned the book to the
libraries but for loan only to the parents of the children at the school. 160 The court
determined that the State of New York had delegated to school boards the responsibil-
ity for the selection of books for school libraries and that the removal of a book is
within a board's authority. 6 ' In finding that there had been no threat to constitutional
rights sufficient to cause the court to intervene, the Presidents Council court pointed
to several factual considerations: the librarian had not been penalized, teachers and
students were free to discuss the ideas contained in the book, the book could be
152. 457 U.S. 853, 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 889.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 889-90.
156. Id. at 889.
157. See, e.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
158. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
159. Id. at 290. The book was Piri Thomas' Down These Mean Streets.
160. Id. at 290-91.
161. Id. at 291-92.
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assigned as outside reading, and parents could still borrow it for their children.' 62 As
a result, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.163
After Pico, the Presidents Council court's dismissal ought to be inappropriate.
Pico directed courts to consider the procedures used by a board of education in
removing a book, and plaintiffs can now point to those procedures to show a possible
constitutional violation. An initial executive session decision like that in Presidents
Council might support a presumption that the board decided to ban the book without
regard for students' constitutional rights. The ultimate decision to return the book to
the libraries on the condition that only parents could borrow it suggests an intent to
prescribe an official orthodoxy by singling out the book for disapproval. The burden
of proof would shift to the board to show a constitutionally permissible reason for its
actions. The court would have to determine the school board's motivation for the
decision. If the motivation were found to be the book's use of obscenities and explicit
sexual references, the court would then have to determine whether these were con-
stitutionally permissible motives. Under Pico the determinative question would be
whether these motives tended to suppress ideas or impose an official orthodoxy on the
school.' 64 Even though they are not bound to do so, lower courts might well want to
adopt this approach.
In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District 65 students brought a class
action suit after the School Board removed two books from the school library.
1 66
Class discussion of the books was prohibited, and they were not to be assigned as
supplementary reading. 167 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, emphasizing the role
of a library as a "mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas,"1 68 found that the
removals violated students' first amendment rights by infringing their right of access
to ideas. 169
The Pico plurality would support this analysis, but five Supreme Court Justices
denied the special nature of the school library and the existence of a student's right of
access to ideas in the library.170 As the Minarcini record stands, however, the finding
of a constitutional violation would surely be upheld because the School Board failed
to offer an explanation for the book removals.' 7' Once plaintiffs show that the action
may have been impermissible, the school board must prove a constitutionally neutral
motivation to justify its action. If it does not defend the removal, the court must
conclude that the board was motivated by unconstitutional considerations and that the
censorship violated students' rights. 172 After Pico, the Minarcini Board would prob-
ably have attempted to justify its decision.
162. Id. at 292.
163. Id. at 289.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
165. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
166. Id. at 579. The books were Joseph Heller's Catch 22 and Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 582.
169. Id.
170. See supra text accompanying note 139.
171. 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976).
172. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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Facts such as those in Minarcini might cause Justice O'Connor to join the
majority and find a cause of action. She stated in her dissent that local school boards
should be able to remove school library books so long as they do not prohibit students
from reading and discussing the books. 173
The School Board in Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee 7 4
removed an anthology from the high school library. 7 5 According to the court, the
school library should be a place where students can explore information beyond the
limitations of the curriculum. By removing the book, the School Board had limited
students' access to ideas and violated their right to read. 176 The court found that the
School Board had banned the book because the theme and language of one poem
were offensive to Board members. 177 That was not considered a substantial or legiti-
mate government interest and did not justify the infringement of students' con-
stitutional rights.'
78
The Pico plurality would endorse the analysis in Right to Read because they,
too, considered the library an appropriate place for students to exercise the right of
access to ideas and information. 179 Justice Blackmun would disagree on this point.
However, since the motivation for the removal was the Board members' personal
values, and that motivation tends to suggest an intent to suppress ideas and impose an
official orthodoxy on the school,' 80 the overall Pico analysis would probably uphold
the Right to Read decision.
As these examples illustrate, after Pico a court's analysis may be more limited
than before. Although the guidelines are not binding, they may point to a reasonable
line of inquiry. Exactly what the lower courts will do with Pico remains to be seen,
but at a minimum they may not routinely grant summary judgment for the defendants.
Once a plaintiff establishes a possible constitutional violation, a full trial on the
merits is necessary, with the school board's motivation as the key issue. If the book
removal can be justified in a constitutionally acceptable manner, it will be upheld. It
remains for the lower courts to determine which motivations are constitutionally
permissible and which are not.
V. EVALUATION
One clear legacy of Pico will be more litigation over school library book
removals. 181 Since plaintiffs now have a cause of action, and since the Supreme
Court majority failed to agree upon definitive standards for review, each case will
have to be tried individually. Because the lower courts will have to decide on a case
by case basis which removals are unconstitutional, they may well become the "super
173. 457 U.S. 853, 921 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
175. Id. at 704-05. The book was Male and Female Under 18.
176. Id. at 714-15.
177. Id. at 711.
178. Id. at 713.
179. See 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.). Justice Brennan quotes with approval theRight to Read
court's characterization of the school library.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
181. There will be more litigation, that is, unless school boards refrain from removing library books.
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censors" envisioned by Chief Justice Burger. This is hardly an optimal situation, but
without precise guidelines the only alternative is to allow local school boards the
unreviewable discretion advocated by the dissent. Such unreviewable discretion
would mean that a school board's duty to inculcate community values, as interpreted
by the board members, becomes an overriding interest. The equally important in-
terests of providing for an educated citizenry and protecting individual constitutional
rights 18 2 would be subordinated. As Justice Blackmun noted, a tension exists be-
tween the inculcative needs of public education and any limitation on school board
discretion to make educational decisions. That tension, however, only demonstrates
that the problem is difficult and not that one resolution is to be preferred over
another. 18
3
A school board's duty to prepare its students to be responsible citizens goes
beyond inculcating local values.'8 4 As Justice Douglas aptly asked: "Are we sending
children to school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we
educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past, to explore all forms of thought,
and to find solutions to our world's problems?" 185 Students need to be taught to cope
with diversity rather than be protected from it. Television and newspapers regularly
present a broad view of reality. Many students will soon go beyond their local
communities and be confronted with a variety of values and ideas, some of which
might not be acceptable in the community in which they were educated. Limiting the
information available to a high school student who will soon be considered an adult
and asked to act the part of a responsible citizen' 86 is not a realistic or responsible role
for the public schools. Community values can be inculcated through the schools, but
the schools should not and need not be limited to that function. The inculcative
interest of the schools represents only one of their functions in the community. 187
Because the preparation of enlightened citizens is at least as important,188 this interest
should not be routinely subordinated.
The major reason the dissent would allow local school boards unfettered discre-
tion is the fear that a flood of student challenges to school board authority would
oblige federal courts to determine local educational policy. 189 Pico, however, does
not undermine local school board authority but simply assures students that a school
board, in making a book removal decision, must consider student rights. The plural-
ity and Justice Blackmun recognized the need to restrain judicial review in these
182. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 511-12 (1969); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
183. 457 U.S. 853, 881-82 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
184. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tnx. L. REv. 321, 337 (1979).
185. Presidents Council. Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25,457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
998, 999-1000 (1972) (Douglas, I., dissenting).
186. Some high school students are already eighteen years old and eligible to vote. "It would be foolhardy to shield
our children from political debate and issues until the eve of their first venture into the voting booth. Schools must play a
central role in preparing their students to think and analyze and to recognize the demagogue." James v. Board of Educ.,
461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
187. Garvey, supra note 184, at 336-37.
188. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). See generally Garvey, supra note
184.
189. 457 U.S. 853, 890-91 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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cases 190 and they did not issue a blanket invitation for litigation. Students must first
show that board activities have threatened their constitutional rights. Summary judg-
ment would presumably still be available to a school board that removed a book for
constitutionally neutral reasons after following a fair, preestablished procedure.'
9 1
Justice Blackmun and the plurality would permit plaintiffs to prevail only where
students can show that a school board was attempting to suppress certain ideas. Under
Justice Blackmun's analysis the balance would tend to favor the school board. For
him, the school board's discretion is a major consideration, and the risk of suppress-
ing ideas is generally of a lesser magnitude.192 Because Justice Blackmun's is the
narrowest majority opinion to consider the constitutional questions, his interpretation
of students' rights becomes a limitation. 193 All that the Pico majority has done is to
allow a cause of action to students in questionable book removal cases. The students
must still prove an unconstitutional motivation on the part of the board. The plurality
anticipated several valid defenses,' 94 and more may emerge in subsequent litigation.
The dissent criticized the majority for applying vague and subjective standards
to determine the propriety of the school board's motivation. 195 That the standards are
subjective and difficult to apply is, however, not a valid reason for rejecting judicial
responsibility. Where questions of "'motive, intent, consciousness, or subjective
feelings and reactions"' are involved, summary judgment is inappropriate. 9 6 By
refusing to review the Board's motivation, the dissent was saying either that the
students' rights were unimportant or nonexistent, or that it was simply too difficult to
protect them. Under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict,19 7 however, students do have constitutional rights.' 98 Necessarily, those rights
are to be protected by the courts.
The dissent would let school board members answer at the polls for their actions.
By the time an election occurs, however, the offending school board decision may
have already been implemented and the damage done. 19 9
An additional and very serious flaw in the dissent's approach is the inability of
elections to protect minority interests. The United States is a majoritarian society, but
diversity and minority rights are specifically protected by the Constitution. "The very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." 200 To hold, as did
the dissent, that the minority must submit without review to majority censorship in
the school library setting simply because courts are not as well equipped as local
190. Id. at 871-72 (opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 872 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
192. Id. at 879 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
195. 457 U.S. 853, 890 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
196. Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431, 433 (2d Cir. 1964) (quoting Empire Elecs. Co. v. United States. 311
F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1962)).
197. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
198. Id. at 511.
199. Comment, What Johnny Can't Read, supra note 23, at 665.
200. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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school boards to administer schools is to abdicate judicial responsibility. The Court
acts "in these matters not by authority of [its] competence but by force of [its]
commissions. [It] cannot, because of modest estimates of [its] competence in such
specialities as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as
the function of this Court when liberty is infringed." 20 1 It is the duty of the courts to
protect individual rights from abuse by the state.20 2
The school board, having been duly elected by the majority of the voters of a
district, owes a duty to its constituents to represent them in educational matters. In
Pico the Board made the book removals a major issue at a subsequent school board
election. 20 3 When the incumbent members were reelected, they considered it a plebi-
scite approving the censorship. The Board obviously had the approval of the majority
of the voters, but what of the minority of the community who disapproved of the book
removals?204 The Board gave the minority no further opportunity to object and did
not allow any students library access to the disapproved books. Students who wish
access to a broad range of ideas and information should not be constrained by those
whose horizons are more limited. Even if the library is merely a part of the total
school environment,20 5 it can still afford access for those who desire a variety of
materials without intruding upon the rights of those who might find some of the ideas
offensive. 20 6 Students have constitutionally protected rights, 2 7 including the right to
hold a minority view.20 8
Public schools must be particularly careful to attend to the needs of all of the
children of the district. The minority cannot be expected to send their children
elsewhere for an education that is more compatible with their beliefs because this is
often not possible. Alternative education may be prohibitively expensive or unavail-
able locally. The minority viewpoint need not be part of the required curriculum,20
9
which is necessarily very selective due to the constraints of classroom time, but it
must not be overlooked in assessing the educational program as a whole.
For the Pico dissent, the availability of the censored books at the public library
and local bookstores limited the impact of the school library removals. Since the
Board's directive did not prohibit students from reading or discussing the books, the
dissent did not believe that the removals from the school library suppressed the ideas
in the books. 2 0 In other circumstances, however, the Court has held that the
201. Id. at 640.
202. Id. at 637. "The Fourteenth Amendment... protects the citizens against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have.., important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." Id.
203. 638 F.2d 404, 411 (2d Cir. 1980).
204. After the lawsuit was filed, the Board mailed a questionnaire to school district homes asking whether the
recipient approved of the book removals. Of the 17% responding, 59% supported the removals and 41% opposed them.
The total number of responses was 866. Id. at 412.
205. See supra text accompanying note 139.
206. Comment, Not on Our Shelves: A First Amendment Analysis of Library Censorship in the Public Schools, 61
NEB. L. REV. 98, 134 (1982).
207. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
208. Vest Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
209. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,869 (1982) (opinion of Brennan, J.); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d
566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
210. 457 U.S. 853, 891-92 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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availability of information somewhere is not adequate availability.2 11 Students spend
a large part of their time at school and may have neither time nor opportunity to seek
information elsewhere. 212 Time outside of school is often spent at part-time jobs,
sporting activities, or general socializing, and the informational input outside of
school is frequently negligible. Lack of transportation to public libraries and book-
stores, as well as the cost of purchasing materials, imposes further limitations on
students' access to books outside of the school environment. The public school is
responsible for students' intellectual growth and development, and it is there that the
ideas and information should be available.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Pico decision is unsatisfying. Neither side has been fully vindicated, and the
Supreme Court was obviously unable and unwilling to resolve the issues more
clearly. Basically, the Court has found that while school board discretion must be
limited by first amendment considerations, students' first amendment rights must be
limited by the special circumstances of the school environment. The responsibility for
book removal cases has been returned to the lower courts, and for now it will be up to
them to define this still uncertain area of law. Plaintiffs who oppose the removal of
books do have a valid cause of action, however, and the motivation for the removal
has become the vital issue. It remains for plaintiffs to prove their cases. Whether
school boards will be restrained only for a flagrant abuse of discretion or simply
whenever their motivation is constitutionally suspect remains to be determined.
Meanwhile, school boards should be on notice that they must consider their students'
constitutional rights before censoring library books.
Helen M. Quenemoen
211. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748. 757 n.15
(1976). See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
212. Comment, What Johnny Can't Read, supra note 23, at 662.
1124 [Vol. 44:1103
